A critical Evaluation of John Searle"s Physicalistic Approach to Intentionality

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Authors

1 Ph.D Student of Philosophy, Department of Low, Theology and Political Sciences, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

2 Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Mofid University, Qom, Iran. Corresponding author: mmkarimi@mofidu.ac.ir

Abstract

One of Searle's most important philosophical endeavors is to resolve the new conflicts that have arisen in the field of philosophy of mind. For this reason, as a philosopher of the mind, he seeks to address the challenges that the findings of biological neuroscience poes to purely philosophical metaphysics. The main purpose of this article is to examine Searle's view on the subject and the author's aim is to show that Searle's ontological explanation is intentionally problematic based on the approach of physicalism, although he uses sound methods and premises. This study has been done in two general axes. First, Searle's view of intentionality is explained and examined, then how he responds to conflicts arising from the naturalistic biological neurology. Examining Searle,s view and paying attention to the criticisms we have made of his view , it is clear that even if there is no challenge between the topics of biological neurology and the metaphysical discussion of intent- which is itself a point of connection- the will does not seem to be Searl's philosophical science is sufficient to solve this challenge.

Keywords

References

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