Peter Winch, contrary to Mill, argues that social and natural phenomena are two different kinds. He believes that social phenomena are »intellectual things«, which exist only in a social context, but existence of natural phenomena is independent from their conceptual formwork. We analyze and illustrate this claim, and in Kantian_ Darwinian framework of Thomas Kuhn’s thought, show that everything that Winch attributes to social phenomena as intellectual things, Kuhn can attribute to natural phenomena. From this, we conclude that natural phenomena are also intellectual things, and the line drawn by Winch between social and natural phenomena disappears. Nevertheless this does not mean returning to traditional Mill’s position.
., .. (2014). Intellectual things, physical things: Peter Winch and
Thomas Kuhn. Methodology of Social Sciences and Humanities, 19(74-75), 69-89.
MLA
. .. "Intellectual things, physical things: Peter Winch and
Thomas Kuhn". Methodology of Social Sciences and Humanities, 19, 74-75, 2014, 69-89.
HARVARD
., .. (2014). 'Intellectual things, physical things: Peter Winch and
Thomas Kuhn', Methodology of Social Sciences and Humanities, 19(74-75), pp. 69-89.
VANCOUVER
., .. Intellectual things, physical things: Peter Winch and
Thomas Kuhn. Methodology of Social Sciences and Humanities, 2014; 19(74-75): 69-89.
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