Classical Foundationalism and the Justification Structure of Historical Knowledge

Introduction and Objectives: The role of historical studies in regulating social interaction and constructing the discursive order of societies makes it necessary to question the validity of historical knowledge and has led the thinkers to evaluate the logic of historical thinking in the light of epistemological criteria. "Classical foundationalism " is one of these epistemological criteria prescribed by a group of Western thinkers and contemporary Muslim philosophers to validate epistemic domains. According to the classical foundationalist reading of the "standard definition of knowledge", the justification of epistemic claims requires access to infallible basic beliefs and deductive inference of non-basic beliefs from basic beliefs. Thus it sets out strict conditions which, althought is suitable for fields such as theology and mathematics, but its prescription to other epistemic fields will have no consequences other than skepticism in history and ineffectiveness of the most important means of each society in understanding its historical tradition and identity. Because tradition is a historical phenomenon that is remembered through historical evidence, and it is revealed to us by the work of the historian. In these circumstances, the application of strict criteria of classical foundationalism in evaluating the historical knowledge led us to discredit the most important source for understanding our historical identity. With regard to these considerations, the central problem of the paper is to evaluate the " justification structure of historical knowledge" in the light of "classical foundationalism" and seeks to prove that the "logic of historical thought" cannot satisfy the strict conditions of classical foundationalism.
Method: In order to demonstrate this claim, the author first draws the classical foundationalist description of epistemic justification. Because any validation of historical knowledge requires an evaluation of the practice of the historian in the light of epistemological criteria. Then he compares this description of epistemological justification with his understanding of the logic of historical thinking, which can be called "minimal reading of the construction theory of history." According to this reading, history is not a passive attempt by historians to discover past events and represent historical facts in the mirror of the mind, Because historical facts are known not in a transparent mirror, but in the light of the conceptual frameworks and perspectives of historians. Thus historical reality is never understood directly, but it is constructed through linguistic categories and in the light of the rusty mirror taken from the prejudices and value judgments of historians. With these considerations, we evaluate historical knowledge on two levels. At the first level, the limitations of classical foundationalism in justifying historical facts are recognized. At the second level, we also analyzed the limitations of classical foundationalism in justifying historical explanations.
Results: The application of this method leads us to the conclusion that classical foundationalism is not a correct understanding of epistemic justification in history. Therefore, it is appropriate to draw the structure of justification in each field of knowledge based on the abilities of that field of knowledge. To put it more clearly, classical foundationalism denies the inferential justification of all epistemological claims and believes that some beliefs are justified Nondoxistically and by referring to infallible sources such as introspection and rational intuitions. Thus, classical foundationalism considers our belief system to consist of two categories of basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs. Non-basic beliefs are justified by infallible inference from basic beliefs. On the other hand, basic beliefs are justified without inference from other beliefs and with a kind of direct and infallible access to the object. if we evaluate the process of knowing historical reality by historians in the light of this interpretation of epistemological justification, we come to the conclusion that the nature of historical thinking does not allow direct and infallible access to historical events. Because the historian's justification for choosing some events and ignoring other events is not based on infallible sources of knowledge, but based on the needs of society and common sense. As the reference of historians to the testimony of witnesses of historical events is not justified through infallible sources such as introspection and rational intuitions, it is justified through the Triangulation of the testimonies. Historians also recognize the objective meaning of written evidence by referring to their lived experiences and linguistic intuitions. In the field of historical explanation, if we evaluate the mechanism of the understanding model and the covering law model, we led to the conclusion that the justification of historians does not follow the principles of classical foundationalism. Because in the understanding model, the explanation of the historical event requires the recognition of the intention, motive, method and evaluation of the agent from the historical context. It is obvious that these action components are part of the inner state of historical agents and historians do not have direct access to them. In fact, historians' understanding of the inner state is not based on basic and infallible beliefs. Also, in the covering law model, the historical event is explained through deductive reasoning and the entry explanandum under universal hypotheses and initial conditions. It is obvious that if the hypotheses include people in the past, present and future, then it is difficult to verify its truth. On the other hand, verifying the truth of the initial conditions requires the infallibility of the witness's testimony and memory.
Discussion and Conclusions: Therefore, classical foundationalism is not a suitable theory for drawing the justification structure of historical knowledge. The lack of direct access to human actions in the past, the subjectivity of historical evidence, the inability to objectively understand historical sources and the justification of historical statements by referring to fallible sources such as testimony and memory are the reasons that do not allow the historian to use infallible basic statements to justify historical facts. On the other hand, the inadequacy of historians' attempts to overcome the problem of other minds, as well as the inability of historians to justify the infallibility of universal hypotheses are the reasons that do not allow access to infallible basic beliefs in the field of historical explanation. According to these considerations, classical foundationalism cannot be accepted as a theory of justification in historical studies. Therefore, we should avoid from imposing the criteria of other epistemic fields on history studies and to define the epistemic justification in history by referring to the possibilities and limitations of the historian's practice.