Brandom's Normative Pragmatics in the Place of Explicating Social Rationality

Brandom articulates a distinctive pragmatic theory of meaning, closely linked with Sellars' inferentialism, which he refers to as "normative pragmatics." This theory addresses the limitations of previous semantic frameworks by clarifying the meaning of language through its application in social practices. It posits that the social practices qualifying as linguistic practices establish the norms that govern the meaning of linguistic expressions.
Brandom examines these practices and the mechanisms by which they shape the normative content of language, aiming to elucidate how specific vocabulary conveys particular semantic meanings. The scorekeeping activities attributed to language users imbue utterances with significance. This endeavor aligns with a broader mission to elucidate the context and mechanisms of rationality rooted in social practices.
The theoretical knowledge articulated in this manner, grounded in practical knowledge, invites further reflection. Recognizing that linguistic meaning is a product of inferential relations underscores the dynamic nature of language as a vessel of rationality, emphasizing its dependence on the contextual settings of communication and social interaction. Consequently, it is vital to consider how language users navigate the processes of inference and the exchange of meaning within social and discursive practices.
Brandom's normative account of linguistic meaning contrasts sharply with a naturalistic perspective that views words merely as substitutes for real-world objects. This perspective often supports the dominance of semantic atomism and representationalism. In contrast, Brandom advocates for a holistic view that challenges semantic atomism and endorses inferentialism over representationalism. Inferentialism defines the meaning of linguistic expressions by their inferential roles within a conceptual network, rather than solely by their capacity to represent the world or fulfill truth conditions. Normative pragmatics clarifies how discourse practices facilitate inferences and commitments, shaping and being shaped by subsequent mechanisms of these practices.
This theory offers a comprehensive model for understanding how language constructs meaning within communities, emphasizing that language use is deeply embedded in social action procedures and the normative frameworks that arise from them. Such an approach invites contemplation of language as a dynamic social activity, suggesting that meaning is constructed within the broad context of societal norms, thereby contributing to the overall structure of rationality.
By establishing a framework for understanding the meaningful norms of language through social action procedures, Brandom's theory has significant implications for fields such as philosophy, linguistics, and sociology. This model encourages exploration of the normative dimensions of language use and the examination of social interactions concerning the interplay between norms and the dynamic formation of meaning.
This essay will first delineate the foundational principles and developmental trajectory of Brandom's normative pragmatics in relation to inferentialism, followed by a critical evaluation of its implications. I will trace the historical lineage of thought that informs Brandom's pragmatic examination of language and explore the context in which he prioritizes knowing-how over thematized and theoretical knowledge, along with the overall impact of this focus on his philosophical outlook. Furthermore, I will investigate how Brandom recognizes the norms of behavior and discourse within the framework of social practices, and how the combined approaches of pragmatics and inferentialism assist him in this endeavor.
In articulating the influence of prior thinkers on Brandom's thought, I will highlight its innovative aspects. However, the primary aim of this discourse is not to navigate existing disputes between pragmatics and semantics or to explore potential syntheses of these approaches, but rather to critique and examine the claim of rationality rooted in the mechanisms of social practices. Thus, while mapping out the main principles and fundamental aspects of Brandom's work, the discussion will extend to a broader examination of our existential conditions and the necessary trajectory of its development.
The central inquiry revolves around the principles upon which Brandom bases our communicative rationality within social practices and their internal structure. What constitutes the fundamental architecture of his explanation? Is this the entirety of rationality? Given his explicit denial of any form of transcendental authority, can it be subject to critique and correction beyond contextual confines? If not, how can it claim the objectivity necessary for intercultural communication? This critical approach extends the discussion beyond general claims and aims to illuminate the underlying principles and logical drivers of social interaction, asserting that there are foundational bases for rationality beyond mere social practices.
Despite the meticulousness and sophistication characteristic of Brandom's philosophical contributions, it can be argued that his inferentialist approach to norms is overly simplistic and fails to account for the complexities inherent in human behavior. This unified description overlooks the diverse origins of thought and the conflicts between notions of good and evil that arise through various transformations. It presents the role of social practices without adequately addressing the historical intricacies that inform them, as if the complexities of history can be resolved through a straightforward mechanism of inference. While the aspiration for enlightenment should not be dismissed, theorizing about it should not come at the cost of oversimplifying complex and ambiguous mechanisms.
Brandom's method of analyzing the internal mechanisms and motivations of action procedures, while eschewing excessive assumptions, offers undeniable advantages for scientific inquiry. However, this approach risks neglecting the content and historical context that shape the motivations behind our actions and the fabric of contemporary societies. Ultimately, the intricacies and complexities of Brandom's discourse may lead to a simplification of the evidence presented in discourse practices, overlooking that these do not encompass all motivations for action, nor can they be expected to do so in the foreseeable future. This limitation arises from the incomplete articulation of motivations in the proofs, as well as the fact that many motivations lie beyond conceptual frameworks and, consequently, the proofs themselves. Furthermore, it is untenable to assert that all aspects of modern rationality emerge solely from the self-propelling mechanisms of social-discursive action procedures.