A Critical Analysis of Amartya Sen and Adam Smith’s Perspectives on Moral Philosophy and Political Affairs, with an Emphasis on The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Authors

1 Faculty of entrepreneurship/ university of Tehran

2 Professor, Department of Institutional and Social Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran

10.30471/mssh.2025.10948.2639

Abstract

this article critically examines the perspectives of Adam Smith and Amartya Sen on moral philosophy and political theory, with a focus on The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Sen argues that neglect of the ethical framework in this work has led to incomplete interpretations of Smith’s economic treatise, The Wealth of Nations. Smith conceptualizes virtue through three dimensions—propriety, prudence, and benevolence—integrating self-interest and altruism. Justice, as a foundational virtue, is deemed essential for social order, surpassing even benevolence in significance. Sen contrasts the “contractarian” approach (Hobbes, Rawls) with Smith’s “comparative” approach (shared with Bentham), highlighting the latter’s efficacy in addressing evident injustices, such as slavery. Smith’s concept of the “impartial spectator” offers universal, unbiased judgments rooted in human conscience, unlike the society-specific contractarian framework. Drawing on Raphael’s analysis, the article situates Smith’s impartiality within Scottish cultural traditions, distinguishing it from Kant’s a priori universalism and Rawls’ institutionalism. While Smith grounds sympathy and impartiality in experience and conscience, Kant derives them from universal freedom. Despite Smith’s global inclusivity, an apparent paradox arises in his silence on critiquing the class system. Nevertheless, his ethical system, due to its coherence and integration of morality with economics, provides a robust framework for contemporary political and economic analysis.

Keywords