An Outline of the Theory of Agency and Structure Based on Allameh Tabataba'i's Realist Epistemology

Introduction and Objectives: The problem of the relationship between agency and structure is among the most fundamental theoretical issues in the social sciences. A wide range of sociological theories, from structuralist to action-oriented approaches, have sought to provide different explanations of this relationship. However, a large part of these theories rests on epistemological and ontological presuppositions that are either implicitly assumed or have received limited philosophical scrutiny. Accordingly, reconsidering this issue from the perspective of a coherent philosophical system can open new horizons for understanding the relationship between agency and structure.
The present study, drawing on the realist epistemology of Allameh Tabataba'i, examines the relationship between agency and structure with the aim of proposing an alternative theoretical model. Within this approach, the central question concerns how human action is formed in relation to social realities and what role these realities play in the explanation of action. The article seeks to show that, within the framework of Allameh Tabataba'i's philosophical realism, social reality cannot be fully reduced to individual actions, nor can action be conceived as something completely determined by structures.
The main objective of the research is to extract and formulate a theoretical model of the relationship between agency and structure based on an analysis of the ontology of volitional action, the types of realities, and the manner of knowing them in Allameh Tabataba'i's thought. In this framework, the article aims to systematically clarify the status of social reality, its role in the formation of action, and the limits of its influence on human will.
Method: This research is a theoretical and analytical study, and its method is based on conceptual analysis and theoretical inference from philosophical texts. The research data were not obtained through empirical collection, but rather through direct engagement with the works of Allameh Tabataba'i and a careful rereading of his epistemological and ontological discussions. In this process, particular attention has been paid to discussions concerning reality, perception, volitional action, and the prerequisites of action as the main axes of analysis.
The research procedure is as follows: first, the foundations of Allameh Tabataba'i's realist epistemology—especially his conception of reality and the possibility of knowing it—are explicated. Then, focusing on the ontological analysis of volitional action, the perceptual and affective components of action and their role in the issuance of human acts are examined. In the next step, different types of realities, particularly psychological and social realities, are analyzed from the perspective of this philosophical system. Finally, by integrating these discussions, the theoretical model of the research is extracted; a model in which the relationship between human agency and social structures is explained not as a relation of opposition, but as a relation based on non-determinative influence. This analytical-inferential method makes it possible to present a model consistent with realist philosophical foundations without relying on the dominant theoretical assumptions of modern sociology. Moreover, in order to situate the discussed issues within the contemporary field of sociology, the findings are compared with some of the prominent theories in this domain.
Results: The results of the study show that, within the framework of Allameh Tabataba'i's realist epistemology, social reality possesses real existence. However, this reality belongs to the category of psychological realities, with the fundamental difference that its existential constitution is not dependent on the individual, but is realized collectively. In other words, social reality is not merely the arithmetic sum of individuals' psychological states, but rather something that is grounded in the collectivity and displays a certain degree of independence and resistance in relation to the individual.
At another level, it can be stated that in Allameh Tabataba'i's intellectual system two concepts can be abstracted from external realities, namely existence and essence, and primacy in the external world belongs to existence. The existence of some realities is in itself, which is referred to as independent existence, while the existence of some entities is in relation to others, which is called relational existence. On this basis, social phenomena possess relational existence, meaning that their existence and causal efficacy depend on other existences, and without them this relational existence would not be realized. Reflection on this point leads to a deeper understanding of the meaning of society and the nature of social realities.
On the other hand, volitional human action in this theoretical system is based on perceptual and affective prerequisites. These prerequisites are formed under the influence of various types of realities, including social realities. Social reality can affect the perceptions, motivations, and inclinations of the agent, but this influence does not amount to the definitive determination of action.
According to the results of the research, social realities play the role of a preparatory or enabling cause (cause mo'addeh) in relation to action, rather than a sufficient cause. That is, these realities provide the conditions of possibility or facilitation for the emergence of action, while the final decision and the issuance of action remain attributable to the free agent. Moreover, external action itself, as a physical reality, has social effects and can play a role in the reproduction or transformation of social realities.
Discussion and Conclusions: The findings of the research indicate that the proposed model can substantially moderate the common divide between agency-oriented and structure-oriented theories. In this model, neither human agency is ignored nor are social structures reduced to purely conventional or mental entities. In other words, Allameh Tabataba'i's realist epistemology makes it possible to recognize social reality as something real and effective without leading to structural determinism.
From a theoretical perspective, this approach opens a horizon distinct from that of many contemporary sociological theories, because its emphasis on the philosophical analysis of reality and action enables a reconstruction of the fundamental concepts of the social sciences. The key conclusion is that human action always takes shape within the context of social realities, yet this context does not play an absolutely determinative role, and the freedom and will of the agent remain preserved—although their intensity and degree vary depending on the manner and strength of engagement with external reality.
In sum, the theoretical model extracted in this study, grounded in realist epistemology, offers an intermediate explanation of the relationship between agency and structure that avoids both individualistic reductionism and structural determinism. This model can serve as a theoretical basis for the development of future philosophical and sociological research and can facilitate a deeper dialogue between the philosophical knowledge of Muslim philosophers and contemporary social theory.
Comparison with Contemporary Sociological Theories: Among theorists who have addressed the agency-structure problem, Pierre Bourdieu offers a similar narrative. For Bourdieu, actions can be explained neither by the situations in which they occur (the present circumstances that apparently give rise to them) nor by their past conditions (the conditions that shaped the habitus), but only by relating these two sets of social conditions: the social conditions in which the habitus is formed and the social conditions in which it is actualized (Bourdieu, 1992).
Among later theorists, Margaret Archer, adopting a realist approach, presents a significant position on the agency-structure problem. Archer posits different layers of social reality and believes in the mutual relationship between these layers. By introducing the concept of analytical dualism, she offers a specific methodological approach for examining this relationship—the relationship between agency and structure (Archer, 2010). It should be emphasized that the term “analytical dualism” points to the fact that distinguishing agency from structure is analytical in nature. Archer rejects the existence of social reality as an object separate from persons and emphasizes that without human beings, social reality does not exist, and it manifests itself through human behavior. According to Archer, the individual and society have an inseparable coexistence, and on this basis, adopting a dualistic explanatory methodology is necessary—a methodology that analytically distinguishes the individual from society and allows for the investigation of different relationships between them (Parker, 2007).
As stated in the realist epistemology derived from Allameh Tabataba'i's theory, some psychological matters are grounded in the collectivity and, as reality, display resistance against the individual. At the same time, since these realities are of the same nature as psychological realities, individuals are always their bearers, and without assuming human existence, social realities—or psychological realities grounded in the collectivity—would not exist. Consequently, the discussions presented in this article are close to the approach offered by Archer.
According to Archer, intentional action, which relies on the individual's psychological characteristics, always occurs within social structure. Thus, structure has temporal priority over action. However, the effect of structure on action is not determinative; rather, structure has a conditioning effect. In fact, the individual acts based on their psychological characteristics, but this action is constrained and limited by structural conditions. Moreover, the action that has occurred under the influence of structural conditions subsequently has a causal effect on structure, reproducing or transforming it (Archer, 1995, pp. 157-168).
Archer's definition of action or agency is close to the concept of volitional action in Allameh Tabataba'i's realist philosophy, although it lacks its specific details. It can also be said that Archer, like the model derived from realist epistemology, considers the effect of structural and cultural conditions—within which individuals interact—on actions as a limiting influence rather than a causal one. In other words, his discussion is close to the concept of preparatory cause (cause mo'addeh) in Allameh Tabataba'i's realist epistemology. He also considers the effect of social interactions on structure and culture as causal, which from this perspective is similar to the definition derived from Allameh Tabataba'i's realist epistemology.