Scientific Communities, Research Integrity, and Boundary Organizations: A Theoretical Study on the Possibility of Protecting Research Integrity in Iranian Scientific Communities

Introduction and Objectives: Scientific research is not carried out by individual scientists in isolation, but within a community and through its internal institutional interactions. A scientific community will function properly when there are scientific norms and a certain “ethos”—in other words, the community should have “integrity.” Scientific research also requires funding, and the patrons of science, including government, market, and industry, rightly expect the scope of “scientific” issues to be broader than merely internal scientific problems and more relevant to governmental or industrial concerns—in other words, the scientific community should be “productive.”
Although these two characteristics (integrity and productivity) are distinct concepts, further reflection and reference to some theories indicate a closer connection between them. If this is the case, policymaking regarding them will also require simultaneous attention to both concepts. This article will argue that the productivity of science (what is commonly known in Iran as the relationship between science and industry) cannot be realized unless the issue of the integrity of scientific communities (i.e., the issue of scientific misconduct in Iran) is addressed. It will also be explained that the solution to the problem of scientific misconduct—not only through legal activities but also—can be provided by forming boundary organizations situated between the scientific community and its patrons. Finally, such boundary organizations cannot be formed arbitrarily, solely through internal governmental decisions and routine policy procedures. Ultimately, hypotheses will be derived from these findings regarding the problems of research-related institutions in Iran, known as “supply-oriented” and “demand-oriented.”
Method: The nature of the present research is theoretical and philosophical, and the concepts that will be analyzed theoretically will be used to explain a specific problem in Iranian research ethics—namely, the issue of research integrity. In the first part, library and documentary methods, as well as conceptual analysis, will be used to describe the causal relationships playing a role in the formation of scientific communities and boundary organizations. Conceptual analysis will explain how scientific communities can resolve the dilemmas between two conflicting values—integrity and productivity—through boundary organizations.
The method of the second part is a comparative study. Assuming the conceptual model derived in the first section, some corresponding events in the United States (in the formation of boundary organizations) are compared with corresponding events in Iran (for the formation of “supply-oriented” and “demand-oriented” institutions), to present a hypothesis for some problems related to research integrity in Iranian scientific communities.
Results: According to a conceptual analysis, a simple a priori rule (according to the individual profit and loss model) can be presented for providing scientific credibility in an autonomous scientific community: scientists who get credit from a scientific community will try to maintain the credit of that community, because the loss of the community’s credit will directly affect their own credit. This rule explains why, in an autonomous scientific community, scientific integrity will be largely preserved. In such conditions, scientists (e.g., in peer review) will not be so liberal that poor-quality texts or speeches are accepted, nor will they be so strict that the community becomes devoid of products.
Scientific communities are always supported by a powerful sponsor. However, the credit rule will preserve integrity when the sponsor has minimal interference and the scientific communities are autonomous. The rule also explains why the autonomy of scientific communities has long been assumed to be an undisputed value. The autonomy determined the boundary between science and its sponsor in Mode 1 of knowledge production.
In Mode 2 of knowledge production, as scientific communities lose autonomy, the boundary between science and politics shifts. Under these conditions, research outcomes or reviews may become biased toward the sponsor’s values: for example, results that oppose the sponsor’s interests might not be published, or reviews may become more lenient to attract more funding into the scientific field. These issues undermine scientific integrity, leading to a gradual decline in public trust in science. As public trust drops, existing social contracts may be renegotiated, potentially causing the loss of values held by the public, such as concerns for the environment or human health.
There will be an expectation that the public will try to compensate for the lost trust. This effort may lead to a conflict that will end only when new boundaries between science and its patrons are formed. The co-evolution that has occurred has led, at least in some countries, including the United States, to the intensification of regulatory mechanisms by the public, and eventually, boundary organizations have been formed that can regulate the conflict of interests between scientific communities and the public.
Discussion and Conclusions: The results provide a basis for presenting hypotheses regarding Iranian research and its financial support, which can be summarized as follows: First, focusing on scientific productivity might undermine scientific integrity; therefore, directing research funds toward solving Iran’s industrial issues—i.e., increasing productivity—will likely negatively affect research integrity. This assertion is supported by reports indicating the prevalence of scientific or financial misconduct.
As mentioned, efforts are expected by the public to establish new contracts and to address or prevent the loss of trust between the scientific community and the public. In the United States, such efforts have resulted in the creation of boundary organizations like the Office of Research Integrity (ORI). These organizations, which can restore integrity, operate at the boundary between the scientific community and the public. By creating boundary objects (e.g., ethical codes or guidelines), they facilitate new agreements between scientific communities and the public.
In Iran, the issue of research integrity was pursued only through the activities of the Ministry of Science. However, the Iranian Ministry of Science is more of an organization whose interests are aligned with scientific communities rather than a boundary organization. Therefore, as expected, the Ministry of Science takes the side of the scientific communities in conflicts that occur between scientific communities and the public, and so denies the flaws in research integrity (which are revealed in scientific misconduct). The result has been that considerations related to research integrity in Iran have been halted after a period, and the problem of research integrity in Iran persists.
The boundary organization emerges from the midst of a conflict—the conflict that leads to the creation of a boundary (which affects the productivity and integrity of scientific communities) typically occurs between the scientific community and a powerful patron. This occurs when the powerful patron is sufficiently powerful to support, withdraw support from, or even destroy science. In Iran, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution can be considered a boundary organization formed as a result of conflicts in the early years of the revolution—conflicts that could have led to a serious reduction in the influence of scientific communities. However, although this council possesses the characteristics of a boundary organization, it is not necessarily positioned at the boundary between the public and the scientific community. Therefore, its considerations may lead to the weakening rather than the preservation of integrity.
What distinguishes Iran from the United States is that there is no serious conflict or demand from the public for maintaining trust or restoring integrity. This results in the non-guarantee of integrity, and consequently, the absence of public trust in science, as well as damage to the characteristic of productivity. This provides an explanation for why the process that was expected to preserve research integrity (and indeed, health, prevention of scientific and financial misconduct, and public trust) has not materialized.