An Examination of the Application of Deontological Ethics in Rawls’ Social Welfare Function

Extended Abstract
 
Introduction and Objectives: Some economic policies, such as income policies, are expected to bring about changes in the distribution or redistribution of income—referred to as welfare imperatives (bāyastihā-yi rafāhī)—such as improving the condition of the poor and reducing the wealth and income of some individuals in society. Welfare imperatives are discussed and explored in welfare economics (iqiṣād-i rafāh). These imperatives are deeply intertwined with ethical values and theories.
The history of incorporating ethical theories into welfare economics dates back to Pigou’s initiative of introducing Bentham’s utilitarianism (fāyidihgarāyī) into his own theory of welfare economics. After him, doubts were raised regarding the competence of economists in entering the normative realm (qalamraw-i hujārī) and judging welfare states, which led some to attempt to cleanse welfare economics of normative discussions by focusing on Pareto optimality (bihīnigī-yi Pārītū). However, Bergson, by inventing the social welfare function (tābiʿ-i rafāh-i ijtimāʿī), demonstrated that normative ethical theories could be integrated into welfare economics in a way that preserves its scientific integrity while also supporting normative welfare policies.
One of the most important and well-known normative ethical theories borrowed from moral philosophy to be included in the social welfare function is deontological ethics (vazīfigarāyī). This ethical theory is accepted as an axiom in Rawls’ welfare function. However, despite the application of the deontological moral perspective within the social welfare function, the nature of the relationship between this ethical discussion and the social welfare function remains unclear. Therefore, it seems necessary to clarify the concepts and features of deontological ethics and its relation to the social welfare function, as a prelude and explanation of how deontological ethics is applied in Rawls’ welfare function. This is the focus of the present inquiry.
Method: Social welfare functions, in the relevant literature, are presented as mathematical functions using mathematical methods. On the other hand, deontology, as a normative theory in moral philosophy, is expressed descriptively. This methodological duality (dugānigī dar ravish) made the writing of an article on this subject very difficult for the author. Therefore, the core elements of the social welfare function had to be translated from mathematical expression into descriptive form to create methodological harmony and thus enable a connection between these two seemingly different subjects. After converting the mathematical form into a descriptive one, through analysis and scrutiny of the concepts of the social welfare function as an economic topic and deontology as a normative ethical theory, the relationship between the two was made possible, and the discussion of this application was completed.
Results: There are many ambiguities in examining the application of deontology in Rawls’ social welfare function. This article resolves the most important ambiguities as follows:

Normative social welfare functions are related to normative ethics. The independent variable (mutaghayyir-i mustaqil) in these functions is composed of the welfare states of all individuals in society. The explanatory variable (mutaghayyir-i tawḍīḥī), “social welfare,” is the desirable condition in a society that must be achieved. The relationship in this function indicates what change in social welfare results from any change in the existing welfare states of individuals.
The difference between utilitarianism and deontology lies in the fact that, in utilitarianism, the moral value of an action is determined by its consequences, whereas in deontology, the criterion is the necessity (żarūrat) embedded in the action itself. It should be noted that this does not mean that a moral action in deontology has no consequences; rather, it means that it is not considered moral because of its consequences.
The connection between the welfare function and moral philosophy is established through the dependent variable (mutaghayyir-i vābastih). In the dependent variable of the deontological welfare function, the increase in welfare of the least advantaged individual (fard-i kamtar bihrihmand) is inherently valuable and considered a moral goal. Thus, it connects to deontological ethical theory in moral philosophy.
It appears that although, according to Rawls’ ethical idea and the realization of his deontological welfare function, society achieves equality (barābarī), in this function, a particular form of distribution (like equality) is not considered a moral or ethical goal. Instead, the specific change desired by deontologists in each individual’s utility is inherently desirable for society and becomes a moral objective. Therefore, in Rawls’ welfare function, the increase in welfare of the least advantaged individual is valuable and a moral goal in itself, regardless of the equality resulting from it.
This moral objective also has a non-ethical background. Rawls emphasizes that before such a form of distribution takes shape in the mind, in a hypothetical and foundational contract (qarārdād-i irtikāzī wa khayālī), through the participation of individuals and groups in certain fair arrangements, they develop claims over each other defined in mutually accepted rules and laws. Individuals and groups, having acted based on these arrangements, have now acquired rights and demand fair distribution and their rightful share. In such a case, Rawls’ theory of justice emerges as a fair plan that meets people’s legitimate needs and satisfies their justified expectations through social institutions. This view of economic justice implies that when using the social welfare function for welfare policies, one should not initially turn to ethical theories in moral philosophy; instead, one should first consider social contracts (qarārdādhā-yi ijtimāʿī). In this case, whatever is prescribed by these contracts is also considered ethical.

Discussion and Conclusion: The application of deontological ethics in Rawls’ social welfare function is explained in such a way that in the dependent variable of this function, the increase in welfare of the least advantaged individual is presented as a moral and value-based goal, thereby establishing a connection with deontological ethics in moral philosophy. As a result of this connection, Rawls’ social welfare function is a normative function; thus, welfare policy-makers and implementers are recommended to realize it in society. In this function, the moral action is that the state must intervene in the redistribution of wealth and income in such a way as to increase the welfare of the least advantaged individuals in society, and this increase should continue until complete equality is achieved.
The independent variable and the functional relationship in any welfare function do not express a moral goal; rather, their connection to ethics is derived from the dependent variable. For instance, in Rawls’ welfare function, it is said that morally, the welfare of the least advantaged individual in society should increase. This statement follows from the fact that what is targeted morally in Rawls’ welfare function is solely the increase in the utility of the least advantaged individual in society, which—according to the functional relationship in this function—by itself and without considering any other consequence, leads to an increase in the desirability of society.
Acknowledgement: Thanks are due to Dr. Mohammad Taghi Gilak Hakimabadi as the esteemed supervisor of this project, and to Dr. Mehdi Alizadeh and Dr. Ataollah Rafiee-Atani as reviewers (in the review session), and also to the esteemed officials of the Research Institute of Hawzah and University, whose generous support made this research possible. Gratitude is also extended to the editor-in-chief and managing director and all the staff of the esteemed journal Methodology of Human Sciences.