Amartya Sen’s Perspective and Critique of the Fourfold Neglect in Adam Smith’s Works

Extended Abstract
 
Introduction and Objectives: Adam Smith, recognized as the founder of the classical school of economics, is known for his two major works: The Wealth of Nations (1776) and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). However, in the history of economic thought, Smith has primarily been identified with the former, while the latter—containing profound philosophical, psychological, legal, and ethical teachings—has been largely neglected. Concepts such as empathy (hamdalī) and altruism (nūʿdūstī), which could serve as the foundation for human behavior and motivation, have effectively been excluded from conventional economic analysis. In contrast, notions such as “self-interest” (nafʿ-i shakhṣī) and “self-love” (ḥubb-i nafs) have contributed to the degradation of human identity and the disregard for ethical values.
In his introduction to the classic edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Amartya Sen raises four fundamental themes—rationality (ʿaqlāniyyat), the plurality and diversity of human motives (takthur wa chandgānigī-yi angīzishhā-yi basharī), the relationship between institutions and the free market, and the strong link between ethics and economics—in order to demonstrate that the systematic unity (waḥdat-i sīstimātīk) governing Smith’s two works is consistent. Sen argues that the perceived tension between the two books stems from researchers’ inattention to the philosophical and ethical foundations set out in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
The primary objective of this article is, first, to explain Sen’s perspective on the fourfold neglect of Smith’s works and, second, to critique and analyze that perspective based on Smith’s original texts and the intellectual and social context of his time. The article seeks to answer the fundamental question of whether there is truly a systematic unity between Smith’s two works, or whether the contrast between the “empathetic man” (insān-i hamdil) of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the “selfish man” (insān-i khwudkhwāh) of The Wealth of Nations has deeper roots in Smith’s intellectual development or in a substantive difference between the domains of the two works. Furthermore, the article addresses the claim that the greatest methodological error (khaṭā-yi mitudūlūzhīk) in various economic schools—from classical and neoclassical to Austrian, historical, institutional, and Marxist economics—arises from incorrect assumptions about human nature and essence.
Method: This research is a theoretical and analytical interpretive study that adopts a philosophical methodological approach to re examine and critique the ideas of Adam Smith and Amartya Sen’s interpretation of them. The data collection method is based on documentary and library research of primary and secondary sources.

Primary sources: Smith’s two main works (The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments) and Sen’s introduction to the Penguin Classics edition of the latter.
Secondary sources: The works of prominent Smith scholars such as Göçmen and Butler, as well as writings of institutional economists such as Commons and Mitchell, and philosophers such as Goulet.

Method of analysis: The analysis combines:

An interpretive-hermeneutic approach (rawish-i tafsīrī-hermenūtīkī) to understanding Smith’s original intent from his texts.
An internal critique method (rawish-i naqd-i darūnī) to assess the consistency or inconsistency of the ideas presented in the two books.
Contextual analysis (taḥlīl-i zamīnihʾī) to understand the influence of the social, political, and economic conditions of eighteenth century England on the formation of Smith’s thought.

Results: The findings show that Sen successfully demonstrates that Smith never abandoned the ideas set forth in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Six editions of this book were published between 1759 and 1790 (the year of Smith’s death), and the final editions appeared after the publication of The Wealth of Nations (1776). This historical fact confirms that Smith consistently remained committed to moral foundations, sympathy, and the impartial spectator (nāẓir-i bīṭaraf) as the theoretical framework for his economic analyses.
Regarding the concept of “self love,” the article shows that Smith used this concept only to explain the motive for exchange in the market, not as a universal foundation for all human actions. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith explicitly states: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.” At the same time, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he highlights the role of “humanity, justice, fairness, and public spirit” as the most useful qualities in social interactions.
Another important finding is that Smith was not only an advocate of unconditional free markets, but also explicitly defended the necessity of “market including” interventions (mudākhilihā-yi dirbarandih-ʾi bāzār) in the form of public services such as free education, poverty relief, and support for workers. He distinguished “projectors” (dallālhā wa siftihbāzān) (speculators and rent seekers) from genuine innovators and described complete reliance on an unregulated market as disastrous.
At the level of political philosophy, the distinction between Smith’s “impartial spectator” (which has an open, transnational scope) and John Rawls’s “social system” approach (limited to the borders of a single state) is identified as one of Smith’s important innovations. This distinction enables Smith to critique issues such as British colonialism in India, famines, and structural injustices, free from the constraints of national contracts (qarārdādhā-yi millī).
Despite accepting Sen’s defense of the systematic unity of Smith’s two works, the article offers serious criticisms of this view:

Smith was deeply influenced by the empiricist movement and the ideas of Hutcheson and Hume, and his inductive method prioritized the description of “what is” (ānchih hast) over the prescription of “what ought to be” (ānchih bāyad bāshad).
Smith thought within the framework of Britain’s class based and colonial society; his presuppositions included the acceptance of domination, colonialism, and structural inequalities. He devised a recipe for the advancement of British industry and commerce, not a universal theory of justice.

A more fundamental critique is that, despite Smith’s emphasis on sympathy and the impartial spectator, he placed instrumental reason at the service of Bentham’s doctrines of “pleasure and pain” (lidhdhat va dard), thereby laying fragile foundations for conventional economics. Ethics—the primary principles embedded in human beings since the beginning of creation—was consigned to oblivion, and this constitutes the greatest methodological error in subsequent economic schools.
Discussion and Conclusion: Finally, the article concludes that it is essential to distinguish between “is” and “ought” (tamīz-i hast wa bāyad) in Smith’s works: The Wealth of Nations expresses the realities of the sensible world and the domination of the capitalist system, while The Theory of Moral Sentiments articulates ideals arising from human nature and conscience. Ignoring this duality and reducing Smith to a theorist of rational selfishness has led both to a misunderstanding of his works and to the decay of ethical values in conventional economics. Returning to an integrated and contextual reading of Smith’s thought is an undeniable necessity, especially for countries that uphold divine values and an awakened human conscience.