The classic (traditional) political thought is said to be based on the fundemental presuppotition that political ethic is not subject to preferences, feelings and personal or communal aspirations, and judgements made in this field can be rationally justified. The epistemological theory raised by positivism rejected this fundemental presupposition and the bond between this sort of epistemology and the traditionl or classic political thought led to the decline and termination of political thought. It is worthwhile to say that the verifiability criterion (principle), which was raised by positivists merely as an epistemological criterion and was said to have shaken the foundations of political thought, was seriously attacked by thinkers like Rodulf Carnap, one of the eminent theorists in ûVienna Circle. The criticisms levelled at this criterion were so serious that they caused destructive damages to the high status accorded to positivism. Positivism was seriously attached not only by those who rejected the verifiability criterion but also by Ludwig Wittgenstein who is considered to be one of the forerunners who advocated and developed the idea of logical positivism in the early twentieth century but subjected it to the most serious and damaging criticisms in his later works. The criticisms levelled at positivism undermined it so much that the traditional political thought was rejuvenated and the way was paved for it to regain its value and validity. In this article an attempt is made to find answers to the following questions: 1. How did logical postitivism reject the fundemental presupposition in question? 2. why does positivism appeal to the Hume's principle that ûought cannot be derived from ûis? 3. Why does positivism hold that reason cannot deduce moral and political affairs? 4. What form can political studies and researches take in a postivistic paradigm and what are their content? 5. How was positivistic dominance over political thought demolished?
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