The Edinburgh school of social epistemology is one of the emergent contemporary schools of epistemology which has been systematically put forth and formulated since the late 1960s. Theorizing, The Edinburgh school specifically deals scientific knowledge (natural sciences) and is chiefly characterized by the fact that it criticizes root and branch the scientific knowledge sociologically. That is to say, not only doesit consider the total epistemological claims as being determined and caused by sociological factors, but it also regards the claims as being determined by the criteria and standards of evaluation performed by scholars. Rationality and empirical evidence are among these criteria. In this article, attempts have been made to put all the stances of Edinburgh school concerning rationality and empirical evidence under sympathetic historical and philosophical reconstruction and critical analysis. To achieve this end, we have divided these instances into transitional and established ones argued that the theory of natural rationality proposed by this school is replete with ambiguities and unreasonable stances. Moreover, This theory has trivialized and degraded rationality. The process of instrumentalizing or conventionalizing knowledge, and the role of social interests in this process has also been discussed. With regard to the stances of Edinburgh school on empirical evidence, a certain kind of doctrine of deficient empirical determination is raised in the established period. As for rationality, we are faced with the process of sociologization the epistemological criteria. Further more, we have shown why Edinburgh school has adopted a unilateral stance towards the explanation of Kohen's wiew on the changing of theories. Finally, we have argued how and why the particular kind of realism raised by this school has made both the reality mysterious and knowledge relative and has eventually subjeeted the Edinburgh school to a false eccentricity.
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